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Animal Utopia: Liberal, Communitarian, Libertarian Or…? [Review Essay] Wayne
Gabardi. The Next Social Contract: Animals, The Anthropocene, and Biopolitics
Abstract
It would be difficult to be optimistic in the face of the political challenges that confront us. Globally, we
have seen stark intensifications of economic inequalities and social stratifications, coupled with the rise
of new nationalist and proto-fascist political movements. The environmental challenges are daunting: we
now face a future where anthropogenic climate change will inescapably and deeply impact the earth’s
systems. As I write, armed conflict continues to shape human affairs, generating continued misery and
displacement; and instabilities have posed the possibility of new global conflicts, including a renewed
threat of nuclear war. For non-human animals globally, the picture is also grim. On one hand, we are in the
midst of an unprecedented global wave of destruction impacting the animals we share the planet with:
‘our global society has started to destroy species of other organisms at an accelerating rate, initiating a
mass extinction episode unparalleled for 65 million years’ (Ceballos et al. 4). On the other hand, and
despite growing awareness of the moral status of animals, humans continue to expand utilisation of
animals for food, textiles and experimentation. As I have previously argued, our mainstay relationship with
animals continues to be characterised by outright hostility, aggression; in other words, ‘war’ (see Wadiwel,
The War).
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[Review Essay] Wayne Gabardi. The Next Social Contract: Animals, The Anthropocene,
and Biopolitics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2017, 242 pp.

Dinesh Joseph Wadiwel
University of Sydney

It would be difficult to be optimistic in the face of the political challenges that confront us.
Globally, we have seen stark intensifications of economic inequalities and social stratifications,
coupled with the rise of new nationalist and proto-fascist political movements. The
environmental challenges are daunting: we now face a future where anthropogenic climate
change will inescapably and deeply impact the earth’s systems. As I write, armed conflict
continues to shape human affairs, generating continued misery and displacement; and
instabilities have posed the possibility of new global conflicts, including a renewed threat of
nuclear war.
For non-human animals globally, the picture is also grim. On one hand, we are in the
midst of an unprecedented global wave of destruction impacting the animals we share the planet
with: ‘our global society has started to destroy species of other organisms at an accelerating rate,
initiating a mass extinction episode unparalleled for 65 million years’ (Ceballos et al. 4). On the
other hand, and despite growing awareness of the moral status of animals, humans continue to
expand utilisation of animals for food, textiles and experimentation. As I have previously
argued, our mainstay relationship with animals continues to be characterised by outright
hostility, aggression; in other words, ‘war’ (see Wadiwel, The War).
Despite these sobering realities that push in upon us, we yet encounter strong
affirmative, optimistic and even ‘utopian’ elements within contemporary theorising on the nonhuman. Here, the emerging fields of animal studies, critical animal studies and posthumanism,
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while taking note of the violence of our relations with non human animals, also reflect
fascinating dreams for new societies and new ways of being with animals. Consider for example
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s highly influential book, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal
Rights (see also ‘Make it So’). I would argue that this important work of liberal political theory is
almost unreservedly utopian in character; seeking to imagine just institutions in an almost
unimaginable future world where mass utilisation and exploitation of animals has ceased. And
like classic utopians such as Charles Fourier or Robert Owen, Donaldson and Kymlicka lay out
detailed plans for this future society, which extends to radical proposals for new modalities of
decision making, work, urban design and sociality. Beyond the confines of animal rights theory,
it is also curious how much work within posthumanism gestures towards futures that have a
distinctly utopian character, at least insofar as these works suggest the recognition of ontologies
and ethical relations that point to completely new ways of organising material and political
systems, agency and responsibility. The posthuman field seems peppered with texts that feature
calls for a radical new ethics that will generate completely new structures and political relations.
Rosi Braidotti, for example, proclaims that: ‘A prophetic or visionary dimension is necessary in
order to secure an affirmative hold over the present, as the launching pad for sustainable
becoming or qualitative transformations of the negativity and the injustices of the present’
(Braidotti 192).
While I think it is curious that so much work concerned with the non-human should
reflect a distinctly utopian character; this need not be considered surprising. If we assume that
an overt and hierarchical anthropocentricism has by and large structured thought and political
action in the Western tradition, then why would it be surprising that any attempt to undo this
legacy should appear idealistic, even utopian? Indeed, any imagining of a world beyond this sort
of anthropocentricism would entail an utterly radical proposal for material reorganization of
global social and political relations.
Wayne Gabardi’s The Next Social Contract: Animals, The Anthropocene, and Biopolitics might
count as a work with a utopian trajectory, at least in so far as the book proposes a total and
uncompromising re-imagination of social organisation. Where Donaldson and Kymlicka’s
Zoopolis responds to a tradition of political liberalism, Gabardi instead identifies with the
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communitarian tradition; although in this instance, Gabardi presents a case for a ‘posthumanist
communitarianism’ (174). As I shall discuss, there are indeed pronounced resonances between
Gabardi’s perspective and the communitarian tradition (I take ‘communitarianism’ here as
broadly emphasising the political role of community contexts in shaping individual values and
practices, against an emphasis on universal rights, individualism and autonomy, which
characterises many ‘liberal’ approaches). However, Gabardi’s text is differentiated from classic
communitarian accounts such as that advanced by Michael Walzer and Charles Talyor, at least
insofar as non-human animals are imagined as integral members of communities; in this respect
Gabardi’s approach is original.
Gabardi’s book also distinguishes itself from other work within the so called ‘political
turn’ in animal ethics (see Boyer et al; Garner and O’Sullivan) by seeking to address not only the
political challenge of human relationships with animals, but also the interconnected problem of
the ‘Anthropocene’: that is, the geological time period marked by human intervention into the
planet’s systems, a geological time period that includes mass extinctions, anthropogenic climate
change, and human exploitation of a significant part of the earth’s surface (see Crutzen). Here,
Gabardi assumes that we have moved beyond a ‘tipping point’ in the range of destructive
processes which are converging on us and that we should ‘lack confidence in the ability of latemodern civilization to effectively mitigate or reverse current trends’ (24). This may appear as a
pessimistic reading; however, Gabardi furnishes a great deal of evidence to support this sober
assessment. The first two chapters of The Next Social Contract are devoted to a careful analysis of
the growing empirical evidence for the crisis that faces us in the context of the Anthropocene,
and the crisis that faces us with respect to human utilisations of animals. In Chapter 1 (‘The
Anthropocene Hypothesis’), Gabardi reviews the manifold impacts of humans upon the planet:
ranging from urbanization, human population growth, fossil fuel use and global warming (1123). On this basis, he reflects: ‘I endorse the Anthropocene hypothesis and regard our current
civilization being on the wrong track with no signs of serious course correction. I believe it is
reasonable and prudent to think and act as though we have gone beyond a critical tipping
point’ (28).
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Chapter 2 (‘The Plight of Animals in the Twenty-First Century’) provides a similarly
somber assessment of the empirical evidence relating to human treatment of non-human
animals. Gabardi provides a summary of the devastating reality of contemporary mass species
extinction, tied with historical information on early human impact on other animals (30-8). He
also reviews the evidence of human impacts on the planet’s oceans, as well as the frank realities
of human treatment of animals within industrialised agriculture, and potentially violent
interactions between human communities and wild animals, particularly in geographic areas
where there is conflict over resources and land, such as urban fringes (38-63).
Gabardi deploys a narrative technique throughout these chapters of offering an outline
of empirical and theoretical perspectives, and then providing a critical comment, which reveals
the stance of the author. We certainly gain strong glimpses of Gabardi’s own political
framework in these early chapters. For example, he takes time to strongly distance the
perspective offered in The Next Social Contract from an animal rights agenda:
I part company with universal animal rights vegan abolitionists with regard to the view
that we need to completely abolish all animal agriculture and domesticated animals.
Domestic and farm animals are integral parts of human society and my idea of
posthumanist communitarianism. Domestication is as much a natural coevolutionary
adaptive strategy evident in many animals as it is a biopolitics of controlled artificial
breeding and domination. The challenge of postmodern agriculture is to distinguish
coevolutionary communitarian domestication and non exploitative labor from the
modern biopolitics of sequestered industrial animal production. (52)1
As we shall see, this distancing from at least one vision of animal rights philosophy, and an
endorsement of a ‘good’ form of domestication, is crucial for the formulation Gabardi will later
offer in terms of a posthumanist communitarian society.
It is in the third Chapter (‘Posthumanist Ethics’) that we start to get a stronger picture
of the ethical approach that underpins Gabardi’s political vision. I should note that early in the
book, we already get a sense that he positions posthumanism as effecting a wide ranging and
fundamental questioning of
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radical anthropocentricism, corporate controlled, high-consumption culture; and the
treatment of animals as inferior objects of propertied use … the logic of moderngrowth economics, the nation-state, and transnational corporation as sovereign
containers and delivery systems of high-end modernity and of technology as an end
rather than a means. (29)
Here, posthumanist ethics is posited as not merely philosophical in scope, but demanding radical
social and political transformation. Gabardi’s own version of posthumanism is described as an
‘evolutionary ethic’ that appears to unite biological adaption with ethical norms. Note that this
bringing together of scientific perspectives with normative and philosophical frameworks is in
line with more recent trends in posthumanist and new materialist literature (see for example
Barad and Kirby). In this context, Gabardi does not only resort to moral philosophy to support
the ethical frame that is advanced, but turns to scientific literature on the role of morality and
ethics within evolutionary processes for animals (67-74). The aim here appears to be to establish
animals as moral subjects, and not to establish the universality of moral principles:
can we derive a prescriptive ethic, a set of moral rules and substantive norms of right
and wrong, from the fact and theory of evolution? The answer is yes and no.
Evolutionary biology can inform, and contribute to a normative ethic. What we cannot
do is derive an objective, rationalist, universal ethic from the fact and theory of
evolution. (74)
We can see here how Gabari is establishing the basis for a communitarian conception of
posthuman ethics, as far as ethics is imagined as structured to evolve – or ‘coevolve’ – in context
with a surrounding community: ‘a person’s moral character emerges from the social character of
his or her community’ (79). It is in this context that Gabardi argues for a conception of ‘ethos’
rather than ‘ethics’; that is, an articulation of ethics that is bound to place and context: ‘one
cobbles together an ethic out of the ethos of a plurality of places and cultures’ (79).
Chapter Four (‘The Next Social Contract’) lays out a vision for how this ‘ethos’ would
shape an imagination of interspecies community. I must confess I was a little confused by
Gabardi’s reliance on the concept of a ‘social contract’ in the book, since this is not a
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‘contractarian’ account which assumes some agreement or consent between humans (or
between humans and animals) on just institutions or just procedures. Indeed, Gabardi goes to
some lengths to reject ‘standard’ social contract theory which, it is argued, only seeks to
establish a ‘sovereign social reality that has factored in our consent’ (128). However, in
imagining ‘the next social contract,’ Gabardi appears to be seeking agreement on how we might
respond to the crisis that the Anthropocene presents, and how we might move beyond ‘the
social contract of late modernity’ (128) towards new forms of social and political organisation.
In this respect, the social contract Gabardi seeks is not based on universal consent or agreement,
but dissidence and competition: ‘resistance to the sovereign order, and the pursuit of exit
strategies from the neoliberal Anthropocene’ (128-9; see also 133). Indeed, pluralism in
response to the Anthropcene, rather than singular agreement, sits at the centre of
Gabardi’s proposal. Gabardi suggests that this pluralism is resonant with the ethics produced
by posthumanism:
What does a posthumanist conception of the good look like? In keeping with my idea of
a posthumanist communitarianism as inhabiting numerous nodal points and niches in a
decentralized archipelago, there is plurality of conceptions of the good. However, one
can discern common core values and principles in coevolutionary ethics, biocentricism,
animal kinship, environmental sustainability, habitat preservation, species viability and
humanimal justice. The elevated status and priority of animals in the social contract
directly implies the need to rethink prevailing models of cultural and institutional
normalcy. (131)
This assumption that posthumanist ethics produces not one conception of the good, but
‘multiple, overlapping contracts’ while ‘all compete for hegemony, and they are all
provisionally binding and asymmetrical in terms of power, resources and access’ (133)
underpins Gabardi’s communitarian foundation. If, as Gabardi claims, posthumansim both
contests universal conceptions of the good and simultaneously proliferates different ways of
living in response as an ‘exit’ from this condition, then justice becomes tied to enacting those
different conceptions of the good within different community contexts. It is with this
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framework in place that Gabardi imagines that experimentation with different forms of
community would emerge like an ‘archipelago’ of islands off the coast of a large land mass:
The large mass of our time is late-modern civilization. The posthumanist archipelago is
not conceived as a determinate collection of separate territorial islands. It is more
decentralized, pluralistic, and network-based, a loose confederation of local and
regional actor networks and spaces that serve as the principle mediums of social
exchange and change. (154)
Gabardi draws here (and throughout the book) from a diverse and sometimes eclectic range of
sources, notably the anarchist thinker Petr Kropotkin’s works such as Mutual Aid which put
forward an interpretation of Charles Darwin and evolutionary theory to support cooperative
forms of social and political organisation (see 157-62; see also Kropotkin). Whether or not an
anarchic collection of independent communities is solely a ‘communitarian’ ideal is something
we might need to consider further, since the idea of establishing autonomous experimental
communities might resonate with other political traditions. I am thinking particularly of
libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick, who proposed a somewhat similar framework in the
closing pages of Anarchy, State and Utopia: ‘utopia will consist of utopias, or many different and
divergent communities in which people lead different kinds of lives under different institutions’
(Nozick, 312). As I shall discuss below, there are important differences between Nozick’s
proposal and Gabardi’s; however, it is hard not to notice the striking (and perhaps strange)
correspondences between the libertarian utopia laid out in Anarchy, State and Utopia and the
communitarian vision laid out in The Next Social Contract.
Is Gabardi’s book utopian? Certainly, at least insofar as there is a proposal here for a
very radical reorganization of the world. However, it should be noted that Gabardi is
referencing real experimentation that is happening globally, including eco-communities taking
‘themselves off the grid’ to reduce their own carbon footprint, producing their own food,
controlling waste and inventing new ways of living with each other. Gabardi also references
experimentation led by animal advocates; namely, the animal sanctuary movement which
attempts to imagine intentional interspecies community outside of the violence of industrialised
animal agriculture (see 168; see also Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015 and Abrell2). Perhaps, in
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this respect, Gabardi’s suggestion that Kropotkin’s theories are of enhanced contemporary
interest seems reasonable; indeed, Gabardi states that Kropotkin’s ‘communitarian ideal is more
promising today, as people seek out smaller “green” cities and “town-country” living’
(Gabardi 162).
There are many questions to ask about Gabardi’s proposed framework; too many in fact
to adequately raise here in this review. At least one question for me is how the pluralist vision of
communitarianism would actually work for animals, and the kinds of freedoms that animals
might have within the proposed archipelago. Gabardi suggests that communities are natural
contexts for practices and values, and that there need not be strong binding universal values that
underpin these communities (beyond the different posthumanist commitments I quoted above).
This combination of commitment to community as the one universal requirement, with a cocommitment to pluralism in how communities live, is arguably central to at least some forms of
communitarianism: Walzer, for example, pronounced that ‘Men and women come together
because they literally cannot live apart. But they can live together in many different ways’ (65).
The challenge faced by communitarians is the tension around whether values determined within
community contexts are subject to external interrogation and intervention. For
‘communitarian’ thinkers such as Walzer, this produced challenges about how we might
respond to values generated by community contexts which restrict liberal freedoms: for
example, caste, status and other hierarchies that are justified within particular community
contexts, but might offend Western liberal values (see Walzer, 313-315; see also Mulhall and
Swift, 139-146). Gabardi potentially faces a similar challenge in relation to the different values
underpinning relations with animals in proposed experimental communities. While Gabardi
stresses, as above, that the archipelago shares broad posthumanist commitments – biocentricism,
animal kinship, environmental sustainability and so on – there is not a strong set of normative
principles that guide how animals are to be treated within these communities, meaning that
there will potentially be very different utilisations and relations:
Different communities will have different biopolitical norms, relations, and policies
under the broader umbrella of posthumanist ethics. Their constituents, human and
nonhuman will differ, as will their primary raison d’être. Some communities will be built
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around companion species, others around sanctuaries, postmodern farming, endangered
species, rehabilitation, contact zones, and subirdias. Their human residents will also
vary from strict vegans to vegetarians to ethical omnivores. Some communities will
adhere to strict ‘no kill, no eat’ biopolitics, while others will allow killing and be
morally and politically challenged to define ‘humane killing’ in a posthumanist
world. (115)
The challenge for any imagining of how we arrange political social organisation in nonanthropocentric ways is how we imagine animals might participate in the governance of those
organisations. This means that animals must be part of the ‘social contract’ in some way; and
even if this does not mean that animals vote or deliberate in a formal sense, there would
presumably be supports available to enable animals to meaningfully participate and exercise
controls over their own living environments (see Donaldson and Kymlicka, ‘Heart’). Would
such a ‘social contract’ allow animals to be instrumentalised for human benefit? I find it hard to
imagine that this would be the case. One presumes that if some experimental communities are
organized around an ethics of either killing animals for food or using animal products (milk, eggs
etc), that the animals in these communities would have relatively constrained choices (relative to
humans that is). Indeed, unless we cling to the questionable view that animals want to be killed
and used for our benefit, then the reality is that these animals will have to be coerced against
their will within these communities in order to realise their participation as potential food or as
producers of food for human consumption. In a sense, this reveals that the communitarian vision
proposed by Gabardi, despite various espoused commitments to moving beyond
anthropocentricism, proposes regimes where humans remain firmly in the drivers seat,
determining whether animals are to be used, killed and eaten. In this sense, the experiments are
not co-experiments with animals in different ways of living; but rather human experiments with
other humans over different ways of living with animals, some of which explicitly maintain a
human prerogative to dominate and utilise animals as resources.
With this in mind, I think it is worth pondering Nozick’s utopia again. The centre of the
libertarian philosophy developed by Nozick is the Lockean property right: ‘every Man has a
Property in his own Person. This nobody has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body,
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and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his’ (Locke, p287, §27). At least one
reading of Locke is that this property right establishes a right to utilize animals as resources (see
Francione 33-69; see also Wadiwel ‘The Will’). Certainly, Nozick does not directly challenge
this view. Although Nozick provides a curious and potentially illuminating discussion around
animals in his classic text (see 33-42), he didn’t necessarily rise to the occasion of recognising
that animals may have a right to property in themselves or may be owed significant recognition,
at least within the pages of Anarchy State and Utopia (for further discussion of this, see
Milburn,‘The Demandingness of Nozick’s “Lockean” Proviso’ and ‘Robert Nozick on
Nonhuman Animals’). However, one could easily imagine a non-anthropocentric version of
Nozick’s utopia, one where both humans and animals had fundamental basic rights to property
in themselves, and justice was constrained to fair rules in relation to the acquisition and transfer
of these property rights. Such a utopia would, at least prima facie, exclude animals from being
assumed as available property for humans. Freed from property status, and the domination this
implies, animals would presumably have rights to choose the experimental communities they
participated in: for animals also, utopia would allow a choice of ‘utopias, or many different and
divergent communities’ where animals too would have opportunities to choose to ‘lead different
kinds of lives under different institutions’ (see Nozick, 312)? And surely, in this nonanthropocentric libertarian utopia, animals would have the right to choose whether they are
eaten or used as a resource by their fellow (human) community members? That is, animals
would be offered a freedom, which Gabardi’s proposal appears to deny.
I certainly do not mean to put forward a worked out proposal for a postanthropocentric libertarian utopia here, nor am I politically committed to such a vision. Indeed,
from my perspective, the central ideological problem with such a utopia is that it would
presumably assume the centrality of property rights and the purchase of labour for profit under
market conditions; in other words, and against my own political position, it would support
unfettered forms of capitalism. But this does raise the question: how exactly would a
posthumanist communitarianism respond to the realities of a world that has been completely
restructured by capitalism producing manifold inequality, destruction and injustice? I note this
question around capitalism, given the reality that at least part of the crisis we face in relation to
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the Anthropocene is generated by the emergence of capitalism as a central structuring relation
(see Moore). The reconfiguring of relations with animals in modernity is tied to this massive
transformation. For example, as Raj Patel and Jason W. Moore have recently observed, the
emergence of the intensive poultry industry globally can only be understood with reference to
the accumulation strategies of capital which have emphasized the mass production of ‘cheap’
food as a consumption item in the twentieth century and beyond (Patel and Moore 4). In a
sense, the story of the factory farm is not merely about anthropocentricism, but about the effects
of anthropocentricism joining forces with capitalism to produce a living nightmare for animals.
In my view, this means that contemporary political responses to the animal question cannot
avoid the problem that capitalism creates for thinking about change. And certainly, thinkers in
the field of animal studies and posthumanism have engaged with this reality. Donaldson and
Kymlicka, for example, in their own proposals for Zoopolis, explicitly suggest that economic
systems will require significant state intervention, and drawing from the philosopher John
Rawls, perhaps require new forms of economic organisation such as a ‘property owning
democracy’ (Donaldson and Kymlicka ‘Make it So’; see also Rawls 135-179). Gabardi also
responds to the problem of capitalism as part of a posthumanist communitarian vision. Gabaradi
makes a proposal for a ‘deceleration,’ which would involve ‘slowing down the fast-paced, massconsumption way of life of late-modern capitalist technoculture’ (156). While Gabardi explains
how such deceleration may work on the level of personal conduct, I find it hard to imagine how
such a slowdown of the economy would be achievable without strong State intervention, and
Gabardi certainly does not provide a great deal of detail on this problem.3
I raise the question of capitalism to highlight that imagining political change for animals
cannot simply be about animals, but necessarily relates to other political projects of
transformation: some real and immediate, others perhaps dreamy and utopian. As Gabardi has
pointed out, large-scale change for animals will require engagement with the environmental
crisis around us, and solutions – imaginings of new futures – will need to confront the questions
of how we reduce violence towards animals and how we can evolve human modes of community
towards better sustainability. This will require far-reaching and new modalities of community,
and force a confrontation with prevailing social and economic relations, including capitalism. It
has apparently long gone out of fashion to talk about what a ‘post-capitalist society’ might look
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like; and certainly the word ‘socialism’ today attracts disdain, perhaps justifiably, after the failed
and horrific totalitarian experiences of the twentieth century. But, I wonder: at this point when
many commentators and scholars, including left economists and green theorists, are thinking
actively about the solutions we may need to confront and overcome the devastation wrought by
our economic system, might animal advocates be able to offer a unique perspective on how we
move forward? Do animal advocates have their own post-capitalist vision? Are our animal
utopias also anti-capitalist? And does this vision go beyond liberalism, libertarianism and
communitarianism?.
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Notes
1

Gabardi, goes on to claim an alignment here with Karl Marx: ‘the goal of working toward

more nonalienated forms of social labor that is so integral for Karl Marx’s vision of human
emancipation also needs to become part of the agenda of a posthumanist communitarian ethic
and politics in the form of new models and practices of human-animal social cooperative labor’
(52).
2

See the special issue on ‘Animal Sanctuaries’: Animal Studies Journal, 6.2, 2017.

3

Although, I confess I felt confused about what role the State would play in the vision proposed

by Gabardi. On one hand, some of the proposals would require strong domestic and international
State cooperation to implement (see 151-2). On the other hand, Gabardi stresses a desire to move
away from the State as an instrument, suggesting a framework that ‘does not conform to the
paradigm of modern sovereignty’ (135). On occasion, I wondered if Gabardi supports rights for
individuals to privately use coercive means to attain justice:
Violence is justified in the defense of one’s life, human and animal. With respect to
protecting wild animals from, genocide, poaching, and extinction, violence is justified as
a reasonable course of action. Killing humans who are exterminating elephants, rhinos,
apes and other seriously endangered species is justified. Civil disobedience against the
abuse of factory farmed animals, research animals and other captive animals is justified,
depending on context. At a personal level, if you are beating, torturing or abusing an
animal on your property in plain view, I will intervene and confront you. (143)
Note, it is not clear why death sentences are advised for humans who kill ‘elephants, rhinos, apes
and other seriously endangered species’ but presumably not for humans who kill non-endangered
animals for food.
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